Abstract-This paper presents a method to cope with reliable broadcasting in faulty hypercubes using local safety information. A new definition, broadcast subcube, is introduced, with which various techniques are proposed to improve performance of the broadcast algorithm. Local safety information is well used in the fault-tolerant broadcast algorithm by considering only safety of the broadcast subcube. An unsafe hypercube can be split into a set of maximal safe subcubes. If these maximal safe subcubes meet certain requirements (listed in this paper), then broadcasting can still be done successfully and, in some cases, optimal broadcast is still possible. The sufficient condition for optimal broadcast of a message is presented in an unsafe hypercube. Extensive simulation results show that the proposed method outperforms previous methods, in all cases.
ance. Several commercial or research hypercube systems have been constructed in the past 2 decades [9] , [14] . For example, the recently built SGI Origin 2000 multiprocessor machine of SGI [9] uses hypercube interconnection structure. References [5] and [10] present experimental studies and show that hypercubes are quite suitable for distributed shared memory systems and multi-computers. When some nodes or links fail, communication between fault-free nodes should still continue. Fault-tolerant communication [2] [3] [4] , [8] , [11] [12] [13] , [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] has been studied extensively.
Efficient broadcasting of data is one of the keys to the performance of a multi-computer. Data broadcasting in fault-free networks is studied intensively in [6] , [7] . One-to-all fault-tolerant broadcasting passes a message from a source to all fault-free nodes in a faulty hypercube [8] , [12] , [13] , [15] [16] [17] . Reference [13] introduces a reliable broadcast scheme, in which each node can receive more than 1 copy of the broadcast data. This method is particularly suitable for critical applications. A free dimension is defined as a dimension across which both end-nodes are fault-free [12] . Free dimensions can be used to partition an -cube into SC such that each SC contains at most 1 faulty node. Such partitioning helps in designing efficient fault-tolerant communication algorithms. Reference [11] presents an all-to-all broadcast algorithm for hypercube with up to link failures in a binary -cube, and presents a new concept, free dimension, corresponding to link failures.
Several limited-global-fault-information-based methods are introduced to deal with fault-tolerant communication in hypercubes [2] , [3] , [8] , [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Reference [8] proposes a fault-tolerant broadcast algorithm based on the safe-node concept. Priority-order is determined based on status of neighbors of the node under process to send the broadcast label and the message in order to avoid communication difficulties. References [2] , [15] refine the safe-node concept. Like [8] , a message can be broadcast reliably only if the binary -cube is safe, although reliable message-passing is still possible in an unsafe hypercube in many cases. Reference [16] proposes a mechanism, safety level, to assist an efficient fault-tolerant broadcast. Priority-order to forward the broadcast data is determined by the safety-level numbers. Directed safety level [3] improves performance of the algorithm in [16] .
Much further resilience of hypercube topology has not been used by the above methods. Reference [18] , [19] present local safety to handle fault-tolerant multi-casting and routing in hypercubes. Local safety is proposed to cope with fault-tol-erant broadcasting for hypercube multi-computers, which is completely different from the techniques in [18] , [19] . The definition of local safety is the same as in [18] , [19] . An unsafe hypercube can be split into a unique set of maximal safe SC. Message-passing inside a maximal safe SC can be completed reliably. Several techniques are proposed to improve performance of the broadcast algorithm. Optimal broadcasting is still possible in many cases even though the hypercube is unsafe. The sufficient condition for optimal broadcast of a message is presented in an unsafe hypercube.
Section II provides definitions. Section III proposes a scheme to calculate local safety information to assist fault-tolerant communication, and presents properties of local safety information. Section IV presents techniques for improving performance of the fault-tolerant broadcasting algorithm. Section V presents a fault-tolerant broadcast algorithm according to local safety information. Section VI extends the method to the mixed fault model. Section VII presents extensive simulation results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A binary -cube (or simply -cube) has nodes (or processors). Each node can be represented by a sequence of binary bits , where . An SC of a hypercube can be represented by a sequence of bits , where . Two nodes are connected by a bidirectional link if and only if the binary representations of the two nodes differ in exactly 1 bit. This paper considers only message-passing between fault-free nodes.
A path is feasible if there is no faulty node or link in the path.
A path is minimum if the length of the path equals the Hamming distance from the source to the destination. This paper first considers only node faults; then it is extended to cases where the system contains both node and link faults.
Definition 1 [2] , [15] : A fault-free node in an -cube is unsafe if it has at least 2 faulty neighbors, or 3 unsafe or faulty neighbors. An unsafe-node is ordinarily unsafe if it has at least 1 safe neighbor; otherwise, it is strongly unsafe. A faulty hypercube is unsafe if it contains no safe-node; otherwise, it is a safe cube.
A broadcasting based on incomplete spanning binomial tree [15] [16] [17] is the following: when a node receives a broadcast label (which is initialized to all 1's), it resets a 1-bit in the broadcast label (say at dimension ) and sends the updated broadcast label to its fault-free neighbor along dimension . This process is repeated until all 1-bits in the original broadcast label are reset.
Definition 2: The BSC of a node is an SC to which this node should broadcast the message.
The BSC at can be derived by replacing certain bits of 's address by don't-cares. These bits correspond to 1-bits in the broadcast label. For example, let node 10100 in a 5-cube receive a broadcast label [11 010 ]. The BSC of node 10 100 is then **1*0.
III. LOCAL SAFETY
Any -cube is safe if the number of faulty nodes is no more than . It is quite possible for an -cube to be unsafe when it contains at least faulty nodes [2] , [15] . Reliable broadcasting inside an unsafe -cube is impossible according to the safe-node concept [2] , [8] , [15] . The safety level [16] and directed safety level [3] consider safety in the -distance neighborhood.
The definition of local safety is completely different from the refined safe-node concept presented in Definition 1. Local safety considers safety in a specific SC where the message of a node should be distributed, but the refined safe-node concept [2] , [15] considers safety in the whole hypercube. Local safety has been used to guide fault-tolerant multi-casting [18] and routing [19] . However, techniques adopted in this paper are completely different from those in [18] , [19] . The safety level in [16] and directed safety level in [3] consider safety in the -distance neighborhood. A scheme to calculate local safety information is presented. And several properties of local safety are introduced.
A. Definition of Local Safety
Definition 3: A node in an -cube is locally unsafe inside an SC if it has at least 2 faulty neighbors, or at least 3 locally unsafe or faulty neighbors inside the SC; otherwise, it is locally safe in the SC. The SC is unsafe if it contains no locally safe-node; otherwise, it is a safe SC. Locally unsafe-nodes inside an SC are classified as: A locally unsafe-node is locally ordinarily unsafe if it has at least 1 locally safe neighbor in the SC; otherwise, it is a locally strongly unsafe-node.
An SC can still be safe even though all nodes outside of it are faulty. Fig. 1 presents an unsafe 5-cube with 9 faulty nodes. Node 00 000 is locally safe in SC ****0, ***0*, and **0**. One node can have different local safety parameters in different SC.
Definition 4: An -dimensional SC is a maximal safe SC if it is safe, and any -dimensional ( ) SC that contains it is unsafe.
The faulty 5-cube in Fig. 1 contains 7 4-dimensional maximal safe SC: 1****, *0***, **0**, **1**, ***0*, ***1*, ****0. Fig. 1 shows that each fault-free node keeps the maximal safe SC that contain it. Labels of the MSC correspond to their sequence. Each node keeps local safety information of itself and its fault-free neighbors. A scheme to calculate local safety information is introduced first, and then properties of local safety are presented.
B. Calculation of Local Safety Information
This scheme is used to obtain local safety information for all nodes concurrently if the -cube is unsafe. For each node (binary representation), check local safety of the node in , , , , concurrently. If the node has at least 2 faulty neighbors or at least 3 locally unsafe or faulty neighbors inside an SC, then the node is locally unsafe in the SC. The node stores local safety information of its neighbors and itself if the SC has been found to be safe. When an -dimensional SC that contains the node is found unsafe, local safety of all SC that contains the node should be checked, and so on. This system does not consider local safety of SC that are contained in a maximal safe SC. This process continues until local safety of all maximal safe SC with sizes greater than the given limit has been obtained. More details on calculation of local safety information are in [17] [18] [19] . The faulty 5-cube in Fig. 1 contains 7 4-dimensional maximal safe SC: 1****(1), *0***(2), **0**(3), **1**(4), ***0*(5), ***1*(6), ****0(7); the numbers in the parentheses represent the corresponding labels of all maximal safe SC. Fig. 1 shows that each fault-free node keeps the maximal safe SC that contain it. Each node keeps local safety information of itself and its fault-free neighbors. The following lists present local safety information of 00 000 and its fault-free neighbors.
Each item, , represents local safety information of the node in the maximal safe SC is . Values of can be locally safe locally ordinarily unsafe locally strongly unsafe faulty Each node has a label, as shown in Fig. 1 , which indicates the labels of maximal safe SC that contain the node.
C. Properties of Local Safety
Let faulty nodes be contained in an -dimensional hypercube; the nodes are distributed randomly, ie, each fault-free node has the same probability to be the next faulty node. Theorem 1 presents a lower bound of the probability for an SC to be safe.
Theorem 1: Let , , and faulty nodes be distributed randomly inside a faulty -cube. The probability for an -dimensional SC to be safe is not less than if the -cube contains faults,
, it is still locally unsafe in an -dimensional ( ) SC, , if contains . Property 2: Let node be locally safe in an -dimensional SC,
; then it is locally safe in a -dimensional SC, , ( ) if contains . Property 3: Let be locally strongly unsafe in an SC, then there exists at least 1 locally ordinarily unsafe neighbor of in the SC if the SC is safe.
Chiu [2] proved a strongly unsafe-node has at least 1 ordinarily unsafe neighbor in a safe hypercube. Property 3 can be extended easily.
Property 4: There always exists a minimum feasible path between 2 fault-free nodes and if the SC is safe even though the hypercube is unsafe.
Property 5: A minimum feasible path between the source and destination , is available using local safety of the MSC that contains the SC if one of and is locally safe in MSC even though the hypercube is unsafe.
There might still exist a feasible path of length no more than even if SC is unsafe, where SC is contained in an MSC.
Property 6: A feasible path of length no more than between the source and the destination using local safety information of an MSC that contains the SC if both and are locally unsafe in the MSC even if the hypercube and SC are unsafe. There might still exist a minimum feasible path between the source and destination although the conditions in Property 5 are not met; for simplicity, this is not stated in this paper. Properties 5 and 6 can be extended from [2] , detailed proofs of which are in [17] [18] [19] .
IV. TECHNIQUES FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE OF FAULT-TOLERANT BROADCASTING
Broadcasting in a fault-free hypercube can be completed easily and systematically. The regular structure for broadcasting in a faulty hypercube can be destroyed. The number of steps required to broadcast a message depends on the relative fault-positions and the source node. Most broadcast algorithms pass messages by attaching a broadcast label [3] , [7] , [8] , [15] [16] [17] , which indicates the area that the message from the node should be distributed in. The source has a label with all bits assigned the value 1. When the message is passed to the next node along dimension , the bit of the broadcast label is reset, which is also sent to . The most important thing is how to determine the priority order to forward the message from each node in a broadcast algorithm.
Lemma 1: If a node has at least 2 faulty neighbors in the BSC, the broadcasting message starting from that node cannot always be sent along the minimum feasible paths.
Proof: It is clear that the distance between and the source is 2, where is connected with both faulty nodes. There exists no minimum feasible path between and because both minimum feasible paths are blocked by faulty nodes.
Let each node keep local safety-information of itself and its neighbors. Consider a message being broadcast with the source 1101 inside the faulty hypercube as shown in Fig. 2(a) . Because node 1000 receives a broadcast label [0101], according to which its BSC should be 1*0*. The node 1000 has 2 faulty neighbors, 1100 and 1001, in the BSC; therefore, the message from 1000 is unable to reach 1101. The message is unable to be broadcast successfully according to algorithms in [8] , [15] . Actually, 1101 is unreachable from 1000 using the label-sending scheme. The following procedure modifies the label-sending broadcast scheme in order to make the message reach all fault-free nodes when the BSC of a node is contained in an MSC. The procedure adopts the following 2 efficient schemes: Scheme 1. Try to avoid sending the broadcast label and message to fault-free neighbors which have at least 2 faulty neighbors in the BSC. Scheme 2. If the source has at least 2 faulty neighbors in the BSC, then send the broadcast label to the last fault-free neighbor along dimension without resetting the bit .
The node receiving the unmodified label does not send the message back to its predecessor. A fault-free node has knowledge of status of its neighbors. In order to implement scheme 1, it is reasonable for each node to keep an matrix to record its faulty neighbors.
if the neighbor of along dimension is faulty; otherwise, . The following matrix records the faulty neighbors of node 00 000 in the 5-cube as given in Fig. 1 .
The scheme to avoid sending the message to nodes which have at least 2 faulty neighbors in the BSC is quite useful. Consider the broadcast problem with the source 1010 in the faulty hypercube in Fig. 2 . It is clear that the message should be sent to 0010 with broadcast label [0111] first, because 0010 is safe in the 4-cube. The message can be passed optimally in its BSC 0***. The message should be sent to 1000 with label [0101] according to the safety information of 1010's neighbors, because 1000 is ordinarily unsafe and 1011 is strongly unsafe [2] , [15] . This makes the message not reach 1101 as shown in Fig. 2(a) . The message should be sent to 1011 with label [0110] according to the first scheme, because 1000 has 2 faulty neighbors in its BSC, which makes the message reach all nodes along minimum feasible paths as shown in Fig. 2(b) . The reason why this scheme can reach node 1101 as shown in Fig. 2(b) , but the procedure in [15] cannot, is that an ordinarily unsafe-node in the hypercube can be locally strongly unsafe in an SC, while a strongly unsafe node in the hypercube can be locally safe in the SC. Scheme 2 is important because it makes the message deroute inside some small SC. The total broadcast steps can still be no more than the size of the hypercube according to this scheme, although the message is not broadcast optimally. Let a message be broadcast from 1101 based on techniques in [8] , [15] as shown in Fig. 3(a) . The source sends the message with a label [0111] to 0101 because 0101 is safe. The message received by 0101 can be optimally sent to all fault-free nodes inside its BSC as shown in Fig. 3(a) . The node 1101 then sends the message to 1111 with a [8] , [15] . As shown in Fig. 3(b) , 1101 sends the label [0111] to the node 0101, and sends the label [0111] to node 1111 (the last processed fault-free neighbor of 1101) without resetting bit #2. The node 1111 does not send the message back to 1101. Up to now, node 1000 is reachable from the source although the message is not broadcast optimally. The message at the source 1101 can be broadcast in 4 steps although it is derouted inside the 3-dimensional SC 1***. These techniques can be used to improve performance of a broadcast algorithm when the BSC is contained in a maximal safe SC.
Procedure: Broadcast1( )/* Fault-tolerant broadcasting in a safe SC MSC */ 1. Let be the broadcast source; set the broadcast label of as . If has no more than 1 faulty neighbors in the BSC, then 2 5, otherwise 6. , send the message and label to node via dimension . 6. Do the same steps as ; each time check only whether the node is the latest unprocessed fault-free neighbor of . If it is not, send the message and label by resetting label ; if node is the last unprocessed fault-free neighbor of , send the message and label to node without resetting label . The node in Procedure broadcast1() is the neighbor of along dimension . This procedure supports -port broadcasting in an -cube, ie, a message can be broadcast to its neighbors concurrently. When has at least 2 faulty neighbors, then send the message and the broadcast label without resetting label to the latest unprocessed fault-free neighbor . Theorem 2: The procedure broadcast1() can always optimally pass a message if node is locally safe in an MSC that contains the BSC of the node .
Theorem 3: The procedure broadcast1() always broadcasts a message to all fault-free nodes in its BSC at most once no matter whether the message can be successfully broadcast or not.
Proof: Each fault-free neighbor of passes the message inside its own BSC if it receives a broadcast label with the bit reset. Let the fault-free neighbor receive the unmodified label, it will not send the message back to because the BSC of does not contain any feasible path going back to . The situations for all and are similar. Thus, any visited node by the procedure broadcast1 will never be revisited. There still exist some cases where broadcast1() cannot find a successful broadcast, although there exists an MSC that contains the BSC. For example, the procedure broadcast1() cannot successfully broadcast a message if the BSC of one of the source's neighbors gets a disconnected BSC. However, the procedure broadcast1() can broadcast a message successfully inside its BSC in most cases if BSC is contained in a maximal safe SC.
V. FAULT-TOLERANT BROADCASTING VIA LOCAL SAFETY INFORMATION
Assume each fault-free node keeps local safety of its fault-free neighbors and itself by using the scheme introduced in Section III. Optimal broadcasting is still possible in many cases even though the hypercube is unsafe. This section presents:
the sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal broadcasting, a fault-tolerant broadcast algorithm, the sufficient condition for optimal broadcasting by the Algorithm.
A. Sufficient Condition for Existence of Optimal Broadcasting
Theorem 4: An optimal broadcast exists from a node if is locally safe in its BSC.
Theorem 4 implies that a message can be broadcast optimally even though the -cube is unsafe. Construct several BSC starting from the source. Consider the source has at most 1 faulty neighbor in the -cube. Let , , , be BSC of the fault-free neighbors, , , , ( ) of the source, where ; the subscripts indicate the sizes of the corresponding BSC. Theorem 5 presents the sufficient condition for existence of an optimal broadcasting inside an unsafe -cube.
Theorem 5: There exists an optimal broadcasting if , , , are safe; and , , , are locally safe in the corresponding BSC, respectively, even though the -cube is unsafe. Proof: There exists an optimal broadcasting from in the BSC because is locally safe in according to theorem 4. There exists an optimal broadcasting from in the BSC because is locally safe in , and similar cases for other BSC. Therefore, there exists an optimal broadcasting from the source even though the -cube is unsafe.
B. Algorithm
Algorithm broadcast2() broadcasts a message using local safety information. When the -cube is unsafe, broadcast2() tries to find a fault-free neighbor of along dimension , whose BSC is contained in a maximal safe SC. The message can be broadcast reliably if the BSC is contained in a maximal safe SC in many cases. A flag is adopted to guide whether the broadcast should be continued or not; it is set at 0 initially. The way to generate the BSC of in step 3 is: For example, the node has a broadcast label [11 011 ], the BSC of 00 101 ( ) should be 0*1**, while the BSC of 10 100 ( ) is **1*0. Theorem 6 presents a sufficient condition for optimal broadcasting inside an unsafe -cube. The algorithm broadcast2() can still find a successful broadcast in many cases even though the conditions in theorem 6 are not met.
C. A Case Study
This example illustrates how the algorithm broadcast2() works. Fig. 4 presents the same faulty 5-cube with 9 faulty nodes as in Fig. 1 , which is unsafe. There are 7 4-dimensional MSC in the faulty 5-cube: 1****, *0***, **0**, **1**, ***0*, ***1*, ****0. Consider broadcasting from the source 00 010. The algorithm broadcast2() sends the message and the label [11 101 ] to 00 000 from the source, because 00000 is locally safe in the MSC ***0* (step 3a). The message can be broadcast optimally inside the SC ***0* according to theorem 2 using broadcast1(). The source then sends the message and the label [11 100 ] to 00 011 from the source. The BSC of node 00 011 is ***11, which is contained in the MSC ***1*, and 00 011 is locally safe in ***1* (step 3a). The message can thus be broadcast optimally in ***11 according to theorem 2. The message and the label [10 100 ] are sent to 01010, and the BSC of 01 010 is *1*10, which is contained in the MSC ****0. Node 01 010 is locally safe inside ****0, in which the message can be broadcast optimally according to theorem 2 (step 3a). After these processes, the message and label [00 100] are sent to 10 010. There is only 1 fault-free node inside 10*10. Therefore, the message from 00010 can be broadcast optimally in the unsafe 5-cube in Fig. 4 . The message is broadcast optimally along minimum feasible paths, which is quite compatible with theorem 6. Actually, a message can be nonredundantly broadcast to all fault-free nodes in no more than 7 steps with the source being any one of the fault-free nodes in the faulty 5-cube, as in Fig. 4 . The message can be broadcast optimally if the source is any one of 00000, 00010, 00011, 10 011.
VI. EXTENSION TO RELIABLE BROADCASTING FOR HYPERCUBES WITH BOTH NODE AND LINK FAULTS
This section shows that it is quite easy to extend the localsafety-based broadcast procedure to the case when the hypercube system contains node and link faults. The faulty 4-cube in Fig. 5 contains 4 faulty nodes, 0011, 1100, 1110 , 1001, and 2 link failures 000-and 01-0 (000-indicates the link that connects nodes 0000 and 0001). While the safety of a hypercube system is identified, the following schemes like those in [2] are adopted:
1. The end nodes of a link failure are considered as faulty nodes.
2. The end nodes of a link failure are considered as unsafe after safety information of the hypercube system has been determined.
These schemes are different from the ones in [2] because the method in this paper considers safety inside SC. Any link and node faults outside an SC do not have any influence on safety of the SC. The scheme to identify states of nodes in a faulty hypercube is similar to that in Section III. Nodes 0110, 0100, 0000, 0001 are thought of as faulty, in order to determine safety of the 4-cube in Fig. 5 . The 4-cube is fully unsafe. Now local safety of the 4-cube can be determined with the schemes introduced in Section III. The faulty nodes or link failures are not considered when they are not contained in the SC under consideration. Consider the local safety of the SC ***0, nodes 0000, 0010, 1000, 1010 are locally safe, while nodes 0100, 0110 are locally ordinarily unsafe. The following MSC exists in the fully unsafe 4-cube in Fig. 5 : 1***, *1**, **1*, ***0, ***1, 0*0*. Theorems 2 6 and Properties 1 7 still hold when the mixed fault model is considered. A message should never be routed to a node whose shortest paths leading to the destination are blocked by faulty links.
The message can be routed to a locally safe node in the MSC if the source is locally safe in the MSC, and ( is the destination). The message should be routed to a fault-free neighbor whose link leading to is not blocked by a link failure in a minimum path from the source to if . To implement this scheme, each node keeps fault information (including faulty node and link failure) of its fault-free neighbors just like the scheme in Section IV. The schemes in Section IV should be modified as follows:
1. Try to avoid sending the message and the broadcast label to fault-free neighbors which have at least 2 faulty neighbors or are connected with a faulty link in the BSC.
2. If the source has 1 connected faulty link or at least 2 faulty neighbors inside the BSC, send the broadcast label to the last fault-free neighbor along dimension inside the BSC without resetting the bit .
The node receives the unmodified label: do not send the message back to its predecessor. The algorithm broadcast2() still works with slight modification by combining these modified schemes. Also, the safety measure in 1) is adopted to forward the broadcast message when the condition in theorem 6 is not satisfied.
Consider the broadcast problem with the source 0111 in 0001 because 0001 is connected with a faulty link 000-inside the BSC according to the scheme introduced in this section. The node should send the message with the label [0100] to node 0100. Fig. 5 presents the time-optimal broadcast result.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
Two types of experiments have been done. Type #1 selects each of the fault-free nodes as the broadcast source, which obtains broadcast ratio (fraction of nodes can broadcast a message to all other fault-free nodes) and minimum broadcast ratio (fraction of sources broadcast a message along the minimum paths). Type #2 are flit-level simulations, which presents latency, throughput, broadcast ratio, and minimum broadcast ratio under various conditions. A flit-level simulator is an event-driven one, which emulates wormhole-routed systems with respect to message-passing, deadlock avoidance, etc. These conditions include the number of faulty nodes, the message length, and load rate. All simulation results for the flit-level simulators are obtained for systems in a centralized environment [1] .
Figs. 6-9 present type #1 of simulation results on 6-cube, 7-cube, 8-cube, 10-cube by comparing local safety with safety level [16] and directed safety level [3] , respectively. Safety level and directed safety level present only minimum broadcast ratio. However, minimum broadcast ratio based on local safety is also better than broadcast ratio according to safety level and directed safety level in almost all cases. Local safety obtains up to 60% broadcast ratio more than safety level. It is observed that the difference between two metrics is even more obvious as the size of the system increases. Figs. 10 through 13 present flit-level performance evaluation of local safety, safety level, and directed safety level. Message length is 16 flits, load rate (flit/node/cycle data inserted) is set at 1.0, and buffer size is 64 flits for each node. The results are average ones of various fault patterns. Results of each pattern are obtained by running the system 30 000 cycles, where the start-up cycles (the first 10 000 cycles) are not included. Figs. 10-13 present latency, throughput, broadcast ratio and minimum broadcast-ratio comparison between local safety and the 2 metrics. Throughput is obtained by using: throughput number of delivered messages message length cycles number of fault-free nodes. Local safety consistently obtains better results than safety level and directed safety level on latency to broadcast a message. Latency of a message based on safety level and directed safety level is more than that of local safety in all cases. The difference of latency between local safety and the two metrics becomes greater as the number of faults increases in a system.
Safety level needs at most 2 cycles more than local safety to broadcast a message in the 6-cube. Safety level needs up to 4 cycles more than local safety to broadcast a message in the 7-cube.
Up to 7 more cycles is required for safety level to broadcast a message than local safety in the 8-cube.
up to 10 more cycles is required for safety level than local safety to broadcast a message in the 10-cube.
Generally, latency of directed safety level is between local safety and safety level. Latency differences between local safety and directed safety level reach up to 2 cycles in 6-cubes, 3 cycles in 7-cubes, 3 cycles in 8-cubes, 4 cycles in 10-cubes. Local safety consistently obtains better results than safety level on throughput to broadcast a message. Let the load rate be 1.0. Throughputs of safety level and local safety in the 6-cube are 0.183 and 0.494, respectively when the system contains 20 faulty nodes. Throughputs of safety level and local safety in the 7-cube are 0.1 and 0.472, respectively when the system contains 28 faulty nodes. For the 8-cube, throughput difference between two metrics is up to 0.43 when the system contains 44 faults. Throughputs for local safety and safety level are 0.769 and 0.220 when the 10-cube contains 100 faults. Directed safety level obtains a little better throughput than safety level in the 6-cube, 7-cube, and 8-cube in almost all cases, but a bit worse throughput than safety level in the 10-cube. Local safety gets better throughput than directed safety level in all cases.
Local safety also obtains better broadcast ratio and minimum broadcast ratio in all cases than safety level. Broadcast ratio differences for both metrics reach 31% for the 6-cubes, 36% for the 7-cubes, 43% for the 8-cubes, 54.9% for the 10-cubes. Minimum broadcast ratio differences between two metrics are up to 10.0% for the 6-cubes, 14.4% for the 7-cubes, 17.1% for the 8-cubes, 22.5% for the 10-cubes. The broadcast ratio and minimum broadcast ratio differences between local safety and directed safety level reach 26% and 5% for the 6-cubes, 32% and 9% for the 7-cubes, 34% and 9% for the 8-cubes, 57% and 21% for the 10-cubes. The difference between performance of local safety and the other 2 metrics is even clearer when the size of the system increases.
Fig. 14 presents performance of local safety when the message length is 64 flits and buffer size is 256 flits when the system has various load rates. The latency of a broadcast message increases drastically when load rate reaches 1.4 for the faulty 10-cube with 80 faulty nodes. For the fault-free 10-cube, latency increases greatly when the load rate is about 1.6. Fig. 15 presents performance of local safety for messages of various sizes in a faulty 10-cube with 80 faulty nodes. The throughput and broadcast ratio of the system are not sensitive to the size of the messages.
APPENDIX PROOFS OF SOME THEOREMS

A. Proof of Theorem 1
The probability for the -dimensional SC to contain of the faults is ( ),
The -dimensional SC contains no more than faults which are separate events. Therefore, the probability for the SC to contain no more than faults is,
The SC might still be safe even though it contains greater than faulty nodes [2] . That is, this equation presents a lower bound of the probability for an -dimensional SC to be safe.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The theorem is proved by induction of the size of the node's BSC. Let the size of the BSC of be 2. Node has at most 1 faulty neighbor according to Definition 2; therefore, broadcast1() can optimally pass the message by using the local safety information of the MSC in this case.
Assume the theorem holds when the size of the BSC of node is ( ). The theorem also holds when the size of the BSC of is . The node has at least 1 safe neighbor inside its BSC along a dimension (where is the least important dimension to meet the above conditions). The procedure broadcast1() passes the message and the broadcast label by resetting label . The size of the BSC of is , therefore, the message from can be passed along minimum feasible paths according to the assumption. The size of the BSC of is reduced to , where has the same broadcast label as the node . The message of node can also be passed optimally by broadcast1() according to the assumption.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
The theorem is proved by induction of the size of the BSC. Let the size of the BSC be 2. At most, 1 neighbor of inside the BSC is faulty according to Definition 3; the theorem clearly holds in this case.
Let the theorem hold when the size of the BSC is ( ), then the theorem also holds when the size of the BSC is . The message and the label of the source can be sent to a locally safe neighbor of [ is always available according to Definition 3] inside BSC by resetting label . Therefore, and have new BSC: BSC and BSC of size , inside which, and are locally safe according to Property 2, respectively. The message of and can thus be broadcast optimally inside BSC and BSC , respectively, according to the assumption.
